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THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974: AN OVERVIEW
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent .... The greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding. Olmstead v. United States, Brandeis,
J., dissenting.1
Almost fifty years ago, Justice Brandeis recognized the threat
posed by the growing technological capacity of society and its govern-
19742 is to provide protection from this threat. Prior to adoption of the
Act, there existed no effective means of protecting this vital individual
interest; the executive branch had no general policy governing data col-
lection and use,3 and judicial action by its nature tended to be more
remedial than preventive. Individuals lacked any meaningful capacity
to protect themselves and no responsibility for that protection lay in
any institution.
The Privacy Act seeks to preserve the individual's interest in
privacy while at the same time recognizing the legitimate needs of
government for information. It reflects the belief that every individual
should have a right to control to some extent what information the
government may maintain concerning him and what uses may be made
of that information,4 and deals as well with the individual's procedural
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 [hereinafter cited as Privacy
Act];
Analysis of House and Senate Compromise Amendments to the Federal Privacy Act,
120 CoNG. REC. 12,243 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974); id. at 21,815 (daily ed. Dec. 17,
1974) [hereinafter cited as Privacy Act Compromise Analys, with page references to
both];
Privacy Act Implementation: Guidelines and Responsibilities, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948
(July 9, 1975) [hereinafter cited as OMB Guidelines].
1. 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).
2. Privacy Act.
3. The confidentiality of information collected by the Bureau of the Census was
governed by statute, 13 U.S.C. § 9 (1970), and other agencies, such as the Civil Service
Commission, had developed their own elementary rules. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. §§ 294.702,
294.703 (1975). See also Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens,
73 MIcH. L. REv. 971, 1297-1303 (1975).
4. The rights and remedies provided by the Act may be viewed as creating a
general "Code of Fair Information Practice" with five basic principles:
[1.] There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very exist-
ence is secret.
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due process rights attendant to government maintenance and use of
information.5  This Note will provide a general explanation of the
manner in which these rights are protected by the Privacy Act. The Act
will be examined in the context of specific rights granted to individuals
and the extent to which statutory exemptions, agency discretion, and
weak enforcement mechanisms combine to effect a potential dilution of
those rights. Throughout the discussion, the language of specific mea-
sures will be viewed in light of the explicit congressional recognition that
the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the
Constitution of the United States.' This premise, coupled with the
Supreme Court's discussion of other facets of the right to privacy,1
should provide a foundation for a broad construction of the Act. Con-
siderations of privacy should weigh heavily against administrative con-
venience, while any construction of the Act in a "gray area!' should be
resolved in favor of granting rather than restricting rights.8
SCOPE
The Act applies only to agencies of the federal government; 9 state,
[2.] There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about
him is in a record and how it is used.
[3.] There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him
that was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for
other purposes without his consent.
[4.] There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of
identifiable information about him.
[5.] Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their
intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND
THE RIGHrs oF CrIZENS, REPORT OF THE SEcRETARY'S ADVISORY Comm.
ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS XX-XXI (1973).
5. One of the congressional findings prefacing the Act was that "the opportunities
for an individual to secure employment, insurance, and credit, and his right to due
process, and other legal protections are endangered by the misuse of certain information
systems. . . ." Privacy Act § 2(a) (3) (emphasis added).
6. Id. § 2(a)(4).
7. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). See also Symposium-The Griswold Case and the Right to Privacy, 64 MicE.
L Rnv. 197 (1965).
8. S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 45, 47-48, 63 (1974). Such a construc-
tion, even when not dictated by the congressional history, seems appropriate, since the
Act is meant to provide a means to effectuate constitutional rights and guarantees. See
note 6 supra and accompanying text.
9. Pursuant to section 6 of the Act, Privacy Act § 3(a) (1), 5 U.S.C.A. §
552a(a) (1) (Supp. 1976), the term "agency" as used in the Act refers to the definition
given in the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(e) (Supp. 1976), and
includes "any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Gov-
ernment controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the
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local, and private systems of information are essentially unaffected.10
Within the federal government, the Act applies only to systems of
records "from which information is retrieved by the name of the individ-
ual" or by some other individual identifier. 1 A system which does not
meet this definition, yet possesses the potential for conversion into an
individual identifier system, will not fall within the Act until the time of
conversion.
1 2
An individual is not granted access to information unless it is
contained in an individual identifier system.'3 This requirement raises
the possibility that information about an individual's activities, if filed
under the name of a group or by some other category, could be beyond
individual access under the Privacy Act. This should not be a major
problem, however. First, the Act does prohibit the maintenance of
certain records of first amendment activities,' 4 records about which the
individual would otherwise be appropriately concerned. In addition,
most records maintained under identifiers other than the individual's
name will not be used in specific determinations about the individual,
and the Freedom of Information Act 15 will grant some access. The cost
and great inconvenience to the agency of searching out all information
pertaining to an individual, even if not filed under his name, must also
Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent
regulatory agency." Id.
10. Certain peripheral provisions, such as the application of the Act to agency
contractors, Privacy Act § 3(m), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(m) (Supp. 1976); see Bedell,
Government Contractors and the Initial Steps of the Privacy Act, 34 FED. B.J. 330
(1975), and the moratorium on extension of the use of the Social Security number,
Privacy Act § 7, do apply to nonfederal systems. The preoccupation of the Act with
federal agencies is in large part the result of the felt necessity for dealing with the federal
system promptly, since it commands the greatest information resources and has the
greatest capacity for causing harm. Other systems, while posing a threat, are not seen as
so immediately dangerous and can be studied and dealt with at a later date. This study
is in large part a function of the'Privacy Protection Study Commission set up by the Act.
See id. § 5(a)(1) (establishing Commission); id. §§ 5(c)(1)-(3) (scope of study
function); Privacy Act Compromise Analysis 21,816, 12,243-44. See text accompanying
notes 162-68 infra.
Legislation which would extend the protections of the Privacy Act into the private
sector has been introduced in Congress. See H.R. 1984, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
For a discussion of the bill, see Note, Let Industry Beware: A Survey of Privacy
Legislation and Its Potential Impact on Business, 11 TULSA LJ. 68, 76-81 (1975).
11. Privacy Act § 3(a) (5), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(a) (5) (Supp. 1976).
12. OMB Guidelines 28,952.
13. Privacy Act § 3(d)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d)(1) (Supp. 1976). See text ac-
companying note 11 supra.
14. See note 86 infra and accompanying text.
15. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1976), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). For a




be considered. 16 Thus, the present definition does provide a balance,
and like the Act as a whole, it is an appropriate starting point in the
protection of privacy interests.
The Act clearly intends to grant no rights to corporations. It is
concerned with the individual onlyY The Office of Management and
Budget, in its guidelines issued pursuant to the Act, takes the position
that a distinction can be made in granting rights under the Act between
individuals "acting in a personal capacity and individuals acting in an
entrepreneurial capacity."18 This distinction is based upon the Senate
Report, which states that the definition of individual is intended to
distinguish between the rights which are given to the citizen as an in-
dividual under this Act and the rights of proprietorships, businesses and
corporations which are not intended to be covered by this Act. This
distinction was to insure that the bill leaves untouched the Federal Gov-
ernment's information activities for such purposes as economic regula-
tions. 19
While not illogical, the distinction would seem to have more viability in
the context of the Senate bill2" than of the statute as enacted, which
16. It has been argued that the Privacy Act may make it difficult for agencies in
need of individually identifiable data for statistical purposes to obtain the information.
See Duncan, The Impact of Privacy Legislation on the Federal Statistical System, 3 REv.
Pun. DATA USE 51, 53 (Jan. 1975). For example, if a statistical exploration of the
relationship between Social Security applications and receipt of other federal aid is
desired, the agency should not be required to obtain the permission of every
individual. See id. Subsection 3(k) (4) of the Act exempts records maintained
solely for statistical purposes, Privacy Act § 3(k) (4), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k) (4); see
Project, supra note 3, at 1336; however, not all records which would prove useful for
statistical purposes could meet the strict definition of "statistical record" contained in
subsection 3(a) (6): "the term 'statistical record' means a record in a system of records
maintained for statistical research or reporting purposes only and not used in whole or in
part in making any determination about an identifiable individual .... " Privacy Act
§ 3(a) (6), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(a) (6) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
17. The term "individual" as defined in the Act, Privacy Act § 3(a) (2), 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 552a(a) (2) (Supp. 1976), is used throughout the Act. For a discussion of the term,
see S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1974); Hearings on Access to Records
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 98 (1974) (testimony of Rep. Koch); id. at 110-11 (statement of Rep. Abzug).
The individual must be either a United States citizen or an alien who is a permanent
resident. Privacy Act § 3(a) (2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(a) (2) (Supp. 1976). This denies
foreign diplomats access to any information maintained about them by the United States
Government, a concern discussed in House debate. 120 CONG. REC. 10,955-56 (daily ed.
Nov. 21, 1974).
18. OMB Guidelines 28,951.
19. S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1974).
20. S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); 120 CoNe. REc. 19,858 (daily ed. Nov. 21,
1974) (passed by Senate).
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COLLECTION OF DATA
The right to privacy is primarily reflected in the provisions which
govern the collection and maintenance of information."2 The statute
provides that agencies may keep in their records only "relevant and
accompanying text, is accepted. It is true that, at least in the context of collection and
maintenance of information, the need for protection from governmental use of irrelevant
or unnecessary data would seem to be as urgent in business matters as in personal
matters. See notes 26, 27 supra and accompanying text. The need for privacy here
seems to spill over into business interests, notwithstanding the congressional finding
that privacy is a strictly personal right. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. This
need for business information privacy would not be limited to individual proprietors, and
would extend to disclosure of entrepreneurial data as well as their collection and
maintenance. Cf. Note, Protection from Government Disclosure, supra note 30. But
cf. Engman, Remarks, 34 FED. BAR. J. 340, 341 (1975). It is thus arguable that the
right to privacy recognized as fundamental in the Privacy Act is as crucial for business
concerns as for personal matters.
Armed with this reasoning, one might urge that the Privacy Act is violative of the
equal protection clause unless it protects business data as well as personal information.
Congress, however, has gone far beyond any articulated constitutional requirement in
creating and protecting rights under the Privacy Act. The constitutional boundaries of a
right to privacy have yet to be clearly defined, but it is plain that the Supreme Court
cases have established privacy rights only in extremely intimate personal activities. See,
e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (marital sex). As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently
stated, "the -federal courts have generally rejected efforts by plaintiffs to constitutionalize
tortious invasions of privacy involving less than the most intimate aspects of human
affairs." McNally v. Pultizer Publishing Co., Civil No. 75-1295, at 13 (8th Cir.,
Mar. 5, 1976). It is thus clear that Congress in enacting the Privacy Act has
undertaken a reform measure, and has in no way attempted to restrict constitutional
rights of privacy with regard to business information. The OMB analysis, then, should
withstand constitutional scrutiny under the one-step-at-a-time notion most clearly enun-
ciated in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656-58 (1966). In Katzenbach, the
Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a congressional suspension of
state literacy tests (for voting purposes) for one class of citizens-those educated in
American-flag schools. To the contention that such a restricted suspension discriminat-
ed against other foreign-language citizens, the Court replied that it would not strike down
such a reform measure merely because it did not go so far as it might have. Id. at 658;
see Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). Under Katzenbach, the
OMB interpretation of the Act would be sustainable as a limited reform statute, the
argument that the need for business privacy is just as great notwithstanding. Congress
has acted to provide new rights and remedies without restricting any recognized right; it
has come to a rational stopping place in distinguishing personal and entrepreneurial
information; and 'the judiciary would not require as a matter of constitutional law that it
go further.
32. Privacy Act § 3(e), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e) (Supp. 1976). If any statute
provides greater protection than the Privacy Act itself, that statute should govern. H.R.
REP. No. 1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1974). The congressional concern here is
largely directed to the Federal Reports Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-11 (1970). H.R. REP.
No. 1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1974). See text accompanying notes 59-86 infra
for discussion of information maintenance.
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necessary" information,"3 language designed to require agencies to make
a conscious and continuous evaluation of their needs for information. 4
Not only must the information which goes into a file be relevant to an
agency need, but that need must also be a legitimate one. Agencies
cannot maintain information except pursuant to an agency purpose
"required to be accomplished by statute or by executive order of the
President." '  While decisions concerning maintenance of information
will be based largely on agency judgment,38 the agency must neverthe-
less be able to point to some authority for its action, either in a statute or
in an executive order.3 7  There can be no independent agency judgment
that it "would be a good idea" to collect or retain certain information.
Furthermore, the information maintained must be "necessary." 8 It
is not enough that it merely be relevant; rather, it must be determined
that the "needs of the agency and goals of the program cannot reason-
ably be met through alternative means."' 9 Such a determination will re-
quire a great deal of balancing of interests and, in the final analysis,
agency judgment. The right to privacy should be given substantial
weight in these determinations, for the basic goal of the Act is the pro-
tection of that right.40
33. Privacy Act § 3(e)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e) (1) (Supp. 1976).
34. S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1974); Privacy Act Compromise
Analysis 12,244, 21,816.
35. Privacy Act § 3(e)(1), 5 US.C.A. § 552a(e)(1) (Supp. 1976).
36. See OMB Guidelines 28,960-61 (discussion of factors which agencies should find
appropriate to consider when making such decisions).
37. Privacy Act § 3(e)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(e)(1) (Supp. 1976). This provision
should prevent (or at least provide a basis for sanctions against) activity such as the
army civilian surveillance program of the late 1960s. See Hearings on Federal Data
Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1971). The executive
order provision, however, seemingly allows authorization of such programs without con-
gressional approval, assuming them to be not otherwise prohibited by the first amend-
ment provision of the Act. Privacy Act § 3(e)(7), 5 U.S.C.A. § 522a(e)(7) (Supp.
1976). See note 86 infra.
38. Privacy Act § 3(e)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(1) (Supp. 1976).
39. S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1974).
40. The Senate Report suggests that "ordinary efficiency and small economies
should not outweigh the right to privacy." S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48
(1974). The interpretation of "necessary" will be the key to the effectiveness of this
provision. If it is given an interpretation favorable to the protection of the individual,
thus restricting information gathering, major agency re-evaluation of collection and
maintenance practices would follow. If, as seems more likely, the agency is given broad
discretion in determining 'what is "necessary," this section of the statute will have little
practical effect. For a suggestion of a "balancing" approach which would require the
collecting agency to "show a clearly demonstrable need that outweighs the individual
privacy interests," see Project, supra note 3, at 1307-08,
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essentially tracked the House version.2' "Personal information," as
opposed to simply "information," is used only in the introductory sec-
tion of the Act22 and not throughout the statute itself, as was done in the
Senate bill. The provision granting access to records speaks of "any
information pertaining to [the individual] which is contained in the
system. ' 23 "Any" and "personal" are of clearly differing scope, and it
may be presumed that, if access were to be granted only to personal
information, the bill would have so stated, rather than using the much
broader term "any. "24
The terms of the statute do not suggest that the protections provid-
ed by the Act should be withdrawn solely because the information
gathered concerns an individual's "business" activities.25 Congress has
drawn a line, not between the personal and business capacities of an
individual, but between individuals and enterprises which have an exist-
ence independent of the individual. Since Congress has not limited the
rights granted to personal information only, a serious problem arises.
The need for a right of access and challenge to a file may be exactly the
same for both the unincorporated business and the incorporated one.26
Both may need to challenge government collection of information. Yet
21. H.R. 16,373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); 120 CoNG. Rc. 10,971 (daily ed.
Nov. 21, 1974) (passed by House).
22. Compare Privacy Act §§ 2(a)(1)-(2) with id. §§ 3,(a)'(4), 6(d)(1), (4)-(5),
3(e)(1)-(3), 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 3(a)(4), 3(d)(1), 3(d)(4)-(5), 3(e)(1)-(3) (Supp.
1976).
23. Privacy Act § 3(d)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d)(1) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis
added).
24. The Act thus does not indicate the distinction between "entrepreneurial" and
"personal" information concerning the individual, which was suggested in the OMB
Guidelines. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
25. There is a reference in the House hearings which suggests a recognition of the
need to grant corporations access to certain of their records, which would by their nature
strictly be "business" materials. Hearings on Access to Records Before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 110-11, 113 (1974).
It is arguable that small businesses need more protection than do large corporations.
26. A differentiation for purposes of the Privacy Act, though an unlikely one, could
thus be made between access to and amendment of tax records of a sole proprietorship
and those of a small, wholly owned corporation. The same would be true of records
maintained by the Federal Trade Commission and other agencies. This differentiation
would largely be a matter of the agency's discretion. Those who are subject to
administrative regulation would also be able to enforce the requirement that the
information maintained be "necessary," see notes 38-40 infra and accompanying text, so
long as they are unincorporated. The corporation would be thrown back upon the vague
relevance requirements exemplified in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632
(1950). See note 27 infra.
27. Cases in the Supreme Court, while not drawing any decisive line, recognize that
there is a limit to demands which the government can make of corporations for the
release of information. See, e.g., FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
Vol. 1976:301]
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the one has forfeited any rights under the Privacy Act solely because, by
virtue of its incorporation, its file will no longer be maintained under an
individual's name.
Since the Act is federal legislation, this problem must be resolved
in terms of fifth amendment due process.2 A statutory distinction may
be arbitrary enough to offend the fifth amendment; while that amend-
ment contains no explicit equal protection clause, it embodies the princi-
ples behind such a clause. 29 The Privacy Act draws a line between
incorporated and unincorporated; the rational basis for distinction in
the information area lies elsewhere-perhaps between "personal" and
"entrepreneurial."3 0  The distinction drawn appears so arbitrary that
the rights granted by the Act cannot be limited to individual ones.3
This limit is an extreme one, owing to the nature of corporations and their relationship
to society and government:
While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made
in the name of public investigation, corporations can claim no equality with
individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.
Of course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of
such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry
as to exceed the investigatory power. But it is sufficient if the inquiry is
within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and theinformation sought is reasonably relevant. United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (citations omitted).
This language is cited with approval in California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21,
65-66 (1974), where the Court upheld the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-506, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 31
U.S.C.). From these cases may be distilled a corporate right to privacy in the context of
government information gathering and use, even though the governmental action neces-
sary to activate the right may be extremely drastic. For a discussion of one interesting
example of a corporate need for privacy, see Note, The FTC's Line-of-Business Report-
ing Program, 1975 Du.B LJ. 389.
28. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is inapplicable since it
is a restriction upon states. See Southern Ry. Co. v. Green, 216 U.S. 400 (1910)
(application to corporate rights).
29. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954):
mhe concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection
of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due
process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always inter-
changeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be
so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. Id. at 499.
See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S.
163, 168 (1964).
30. This ii not to suggest that there are no privacy interests arising from entrepre-
neurial activities. The Freedom of Information Act exempts trade secrets and other con-
fidential business data from mandatory disclosure, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (4) (Supp. 1976),
and corporate entities have filed "reverse FOIA" suitA to prohibit disclosure of business
information by federal agencies. See, e.g., Charles River Park "A," Inc. v. HUD, 519
F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See generally Note, Protection from Government Disclo-
sure-The Reverse-FOIA Suit, 1976 DuKE L. 330; note 27 supra.
3 1. It may be possible to avoid this constitutional problem entirely if the OM's
distinction between personal and entrepreneurial information, see note 18 supra and
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In acquiring their information, agencies are to rely primarily on the
individual concerned "when the information may result in adverse deter-
minations about an individual's rights."41  Since virtually all informa-
tion collected may have such an effect, this language could be construed
as a mandate to collect all information directly from the individual
concerned where possible. The agency need not do everything in its
power to obtain information from the individual; the statute requires
that it do so only to the "greatest extent practicable. '42 For example, it
would clearly not be regarded as practicable to collect information
directly from the individual who is the object of a criminal investigation
when the government does not wish to "tip off" that individual. Other
factors, such as the amount of time available to collect the information,
ability to locate the individual, and the probability and magnitude of any
harm which could possibly result to the individual from the maintenance
of the information, should be taken into account in making the deci-
sion.4' However, it is the agency itself which will balance the factors,
and the flexibility inherent in a "practicability" test may make it ex-
tremely difficult to obtain review of agency action.
At the time the agency requests information, it must supply certain
data to the individual to whom it makes the request.44 The agency
must inform the individual of the authority by which it is collecting the
information,45 whether or not the individual must answer the questions
asked of him," the purposes for which the information is to be used,4 7
any routine uses to be made of the information,4 and the effect on the
individual of a refusal to give the requested information.49 The OMB
Guidelines suggest that this requirement applies only when the indivi-
dual could be adversely affected by the information, 0 but this view ap-
pears incorrect for two reasons. First, the mandate to collect informa-
tion directly from the subject individual is independent of the require-
ment to furnish information: the latter requirement instructs the agency
41. Privacy Act § 3(e)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(2) (Supp. 1976). There is no
definition of "determination." See note 82 infra.
42. Id.
43. S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1974). See also OMB Guidelines
28,961 (suggests consideration of nature of program, cost, risk of inaccuracy resulting
from third-party sources, and need for use of third party to verify information held).
44. Privacy Act § 3(e)(3), § 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e) (3) (Supp. 1976).
45. Privacy Act § 3(e)(3)(A), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(3)(A) (Supp. 1976).
46. Id.
47. Privacy Act § 3(e)(3)(B), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(3)(B) (Supp. 1976).
48. Privacy Act § 3(e)(3)(C), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(3)(C) (Supp. 1976).
49. Privacy Act § 3(e)(3)(D), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(3)(D) (Supp. 1976).
50. OMB Guidelines 28,961.
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to "inform each individual whom it asks to supply information."5' Sec-
ond, by requiring disclosure of the effects of a refusal to supply the
requested information, 2 the statute implies that the agency should in-
form the individual not only of possible adverse effects, but also, where
applicable, that no adverse effects will result.
As a result of agency fears that certain information could not be
obtained unless the individual providing it felt that he could speak
frankly without fear of retribution,5" provision is made in the Act for
express pledges of confidentiality."4 Unfortunately, there are no rules
set forth in the statute to govern agency use of these pledges. 5 A
provision which will exert substantial influence on the application of the
Act through the exemption sections 8 should have received greater
congressional attention rather than being left largely to agency discre-
tion. The mere statement on an information form that a pledge is
available will often result in a request for it whether a pledge is actually
needed or not. This could create an unnecessary obstacle for the
individual who seeks to review information concerning himself. Pledges
under the Act will not, however, result in absolute confidentiality. The
material will be exempt only to the extent that its disclosure would
reveal a source.5 7 If none of it can be revealed without disclosing a
source, the agency must nevertheless inform the individual concerned
that the material exists and furnish a general characterization of it.18  It
51. Privacy Act § 3(e)(3), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e).(3) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis
added).
52. Privacy Act § 3(e) (3) (D), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e) (3) (D) (Supp. 1976).
53. See Hearings on H.R. 12206 and Related Bills Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1974) (statement of Mary
C. Lawton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of
Justice); id. at 185-86 (statement of Thomas S. McFee, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Management, Planning, and Technology, Department of Health, Education and Welfare).
The HEW statement is somewhat unique in its opposition to blanket exemptions in this
area. See, e.g., id. at 212-13 (statement of Edward C. Schmults, General Counsel, De-
partment of the Treasury); id. at 240 (statement of David 0. Cooke, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense).
54. Privacy Act H9 3(k)(2), (5), (7), 5 U.S.C.A. H9 552a(k)(2), (5), (7) (Supp.
1976). These exemptions, which agencies may use to withhold information from
individuals, focus upon the existence of express pledges of confidentiality. Implied
pledges are no longer recognized, unless given before the effective date of the Act.
55. Congress did indicate a desire that these pledges should be given sparingly and
that the Office of Management and Budget should exert influence over agencies to see
that this power is not abused. Privacy Act Compromise Analysis 12,244, 21,816. See
OMB Guidelines 28,973.
56. See note 54 supra and text accompanying notes 131, 140-41 infra.
57. Privacy Act H9 3(k)(2), (5), (7), 5 U.S.C.A. H§ 552a(k)(2), (5), (7) (Supp.
1976).
58. Privacy Act Compromise Analysis 12,244, 21,816.
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is unclear how general a characterization will satisfy Congress; it must
be recognized that the source of certain information will be disclosed by
any characterization of the material, as in the case when only one person
besides the individual concerned possessed the knowledge.
MAINTENANCE AND USE
Once the agency has collected information, its uses of it are not
unrestricted. Except in certain circumstances, no information may be
disclosed without the consent of the individual.59 The listed circum-
stances are broad enough to allow disclosure in almost all situations
where there is a legitimate need for disclosure.60 Indeed, one may
question whether the consent provision provides a real limitation upon
agency activity. In addition to the consent provisions, the agency must
maintain an accounting of disclosures under this section,6 except for
59. Privacy Act § 3(b), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (Supp. 1976).
60. Privacy Act § 3(b), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (Supp. 1976), provides the following
exceptions to the consent requirement:
(1) to those officers and employees of the agency which maintains the
record who have a need for the record in the performance of their duties;(2) required under section 552 of this title;(3) for a routine use as defined in subsection (a) (7) of this section and
described under subsection (e) (4) (D) of this section;(4) to the Bureau of the Census for purposes of planning or carrying out
a census or survey or related activity pursuant to the provisions of title 13;(5) to a recipient who has provided the agency with advance adequate
written assurance that the record will be used solely as a statistical research
or reporting record, and the record is to be transferred in a form that is not
individually identifiable;
(6) to the National Archives of the United StateS as a record which has
sufficient historical or other value to warrant its continued preservation by the
United States Government, or for evaluation by the Administrator of General
Services or his designee to determine whether the record has such value;(7) to another agency or to an instrumentality of any governmental juris-
diction within or under the control of the United States for a civil or criminal
law enforcement activity if the activity is authorized by law, and if the head
of the agency or instrumentality has made a written request to the agency
which maintains the record specifying the particular portion desired and the
law enforcement activity for which the record is sought;(8) to a person pursuant to a showing of compelling circumstances affect-
ing the health or safety of an individual if upon such disclosure notification
is transmitted to the last known address of such individual;
(9) to either Rouse of Congress, or, to the extent of matter within itsjurisdiction, any committee or subcommittee thereof, any joint committee of
Congress or subcommittee of any such joint committee;(10) to the Comptroller General, or any of his authorized representatives,
in the course of the performance of the duties of the General Accounting Of-
fice; or(11) pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
See text accompanying notes 73-81 infra for a discussion of the routine use exception.
61. Privacy Act § 3(c)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(c)(1) (Supp. 1976). The account-
ing must be made available to the individual at his request, except for disclosures made
for a law enforcement activity. Privkcy Act § 3(c) (3), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(c) (3) (Supp.
1976). This provides a trail for the individual so that he may learn who has had access
to his record, and more importantly, why. The accounting must contain the date,
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disclosures made within the agency to those officers and employees who
have a need to know6 2 and those disclosures required under the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA). 3  The provision which exempts
disclosures under the FOIA from the accounting requirement is one of
the bridges between the two statutes. Consent for such disclosures need
not be obtained6 4 and the agency need not review the record before
disseminating it pursuant to an FOIA request.65  The Privacy Act also
provides that agencies may not use the FOIA exemptions to deny an
individual access to his file if he is otherwise entitled to access under the
provisions of the Privacy Act.66
The Privacy Act and the FOIA
Congress clearly intended that the Privacy Act have no effect on
the operation of the FOIA; public access is to remain as before.1r The
Acts are intended to work together so that the individual can employ the
provisions of the Privacy Act to gain access to information denied him
as an unidentified member of the public under the FOIA.
A major problem may arise from the FOIA exemption for infor-
mation "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." 68  If a Priva-
cy Act exemption is construed as being broader than a companion
exemption under the FOIA, an agency might attempt to use the Privacy
Act to justify nondisclosure under the statutory exemption, even though
in the absence of the Privacy Act's broad disclosure provisions, the
nature, and purpose of the disclosure and the name and address of the person to whom
the disclosure was made. Privacy Act § 3(c)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. I 552a(c)(1) (Supp.
1976).
62. Privacy Act § 3(c)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(c)(1) (Supp. 1976), creates the
exception for disclosures made under Privacy Act § 3(b)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b)(1)
(Supp. 1976).
63. Privacy Act § 3(c)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(c)(1) (Supp. 1976), again creates
the exception for disclosures under Privacy Act § 3(b)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b)(2)
(Supp. 1976).
64. Privacy Act § 3(b)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (2) (Supp. 1976).
65. Privacy Act § 3(e) (6), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e) (6) (Supp. 1976). Lack of review
here may cause problems. The government is relinquishing all control of the informa-
tion to someone who intends to use it for his own purposes. It would therefore seem
appropriate that the information be as accurate as possible. See text accompanying note
84 infra. The provision is apparently a concession to the number of FOIA requests and
the administrative burdzn which would result from review of such records before release.
66. Privacy Act § 3(q), 5 U.S.CA. § 552a(q) (Supp. 1976).
67. Privacy Act Compromise Analysis 12,244, 21,817. The statute "is designed to
preserve the status quo as interpreted by the courts regarding the disclosure of personal
information under that section [FOIA]." Id. For a discussion of the interaction
between the two statutes, see Project, supra note 3, at 1336-40.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)'(3) (1970).
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individual could have obtained the information. Such a construction
was clearly not the intent of Congress."
Under a technical construction of the Privacy Act, nothing is
"specifically required" to be exempted. Each agency is vested with a
great deal of discretion. But this discretion is not in itself sufficient to
overcome the Supreme Court's construction of the exemption in FAA
Administrator v. Robertson.70  Relying heavily on legislative history,
the Court found that Congress, in passing the FOIA, left undisturbed
those statutes which gave agencies discretionary authority to withhold
information. Documents withheld under such a statute therefore fit the
requirements of the statutory exemption. Since the Court's decision
turns on legislative history, the history of the Privacy Act could be
employed to show that Congress clearly intended that it would not be a
statute which could be invoked to justify nondisclosure under exemption
(b)(3) of the FOIA. If the courts and agencies nevertheless insist
upon following Robertson, amendment of either the Privacy Act or the
FOIA would be necessary.
In order to effectuate fully an alternate policy of giving the individ-
ual control over information concerning him which is in government
files, the agency could justifiably resolve any doubt as to the applicabili-
ty of an exemption under the FOIA, such as the exemption for disclo-
sures which would be a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, ' 71 by invoking the exemption and then attempting to obtain the
consent of the individual concerned for the disclosure. This procedure
would allow the individual to control the dissemination of information
about himself which is arguably private and for which the requesting
party under the FOIA has not been required to show any need.72
Routine Uses
Agencies may establish "routine uses" for records by publication in
the Federal Register,"' and disclosure pursuant to such uses does not
69. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
70. 422 U.S. 255 (1975). The FAA Administrator had invoked his authority under
a statute which authorized nondisclosure upon a party's objection to public disclosure and
the administrator's determination that the objecting party would be adversely affected
and the public interest did not require disclosure. 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970).
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6) (1970).
72. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. 1976) (upon
request for information, agency "shall make the records promptly available to any
person"). See also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973); cf. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 n.16 (1975).
73. Privacy Act §§ 3(e)(4)(D), 3(e)(11), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e) (4) (D), (e)(11)
(Supp. 1976). The Act defines this use as a "use of such record for a purpose which is
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require the consent of the individual.74 In the House debate, routine
uses were referred to as "all of the proper and necessary uses even if any
such use occurs infrequently. '7 5  Within this definition are such ex-
changes as reference of a file from one agency to another for possible
civil or criminal prosecution and the transfer of tax return information
from the Internal Revenue Service to state and local taxing authorities.76
The agency must publish the intended use of information in the Federal
Register at least thirty days prior to its institution.7T In the interim, any
exchanges must be pursuant to some other provision of the disclosure
section or with the consent of the individual concerned.78
The routine use provision carries with it the potential for serious
abuse. Congressional oversight is presently the major check against
wholesale agency publication designed to establish routine uses which
cover situations where, in keeping with the spirit and the letter of the
Act, disclosure would require the consent of the individual concerned.
Individual actions against agencies provide a partial solution to this
potential problem, 79 but the overwhelming volume of material recently
published by agencies"0 suggests that the availability of such actions may
not be sufficient to deter agency abuse.81
Information Quality
If the agency makes any determination about an individual, the
records used must be in such a condition of "accuracy, relevance,
timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness
compatible with the purpose for which it was collected." Privacy Act § 3(a)(7), 5
U.S.C.A. § 552a(a)(7) (Supp. 1976).
74. Privacy Act § 3(b)(3), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b)(3) (Sapp. 1976).
75. 120 CONG. REC. 10,962 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Moorhead)
(emphasis added).
76. Privacy Act Compromise Analysis 12,244, 21,816. See also 120 CONG. REC.
21,815 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id. at 12,246-47
(daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Moorhead).
77. Privacy Act § 3(e)(11), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(11) (Supp. 1976).
78. Disclosure is possible by the agency only under some provision of section 3(b).
Privacy Act § 3(b), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (Supp. 976).
79. See notes 147-62 infra and accompanying text.
80. See OFicE OF THE FwAu.L REISTER, NATIONAL ARCHI AND RECORDS
SERvicE, GENERAL SERvicES ADMINISTRATION, PROTECrING YouR RIGHT TO PRIVACY-
DIOnsT oF SYSTEMS OF REcoRDs, AGENCY RuLEs, REsPARCH Ams (1976).
81. Supervision needed here would have been within the province of a Federal
Privacy Board or Commission, had one been created as proposed in several bills. See
H.R. Nos. 12,207, 13,304, 13,872, 14,493, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. Nos. 2542,
3416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The Privacy Protection Study Commission set up
by the Act lacks authority in this area. See text accompanying notes 163-67 infra.
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to the individual in the determination.""2 When one agency transfers a
record to another, the record need not meet these standards; however,
the receiving agency must bring the record up to standard before using
it.13  In contrast, the standards must be complied with when the agency
releases the records to a person not affiliated with another agency,84
since in this situation the federal government is relinquishing control of
the information.
While the previously discussed standards of relevance and necessi-
ty85 govern general information maintenance of systems, these more
detailed standards govern the quality of information which is maintained
in each individual file. Both sets of standards, however, leave a great
deal to agency judgment and discretion. If courts interpret these stand-
ards loosely, little will have been gained through passage of the 'statute.
A stricter definition of these standards, though, could have destroyed the
flexibility needed for the application of the Act to diverse federal
agencies while greatly increasing the general cost of administration. 8
ACCESS AND AMENDMENT
When an individual learns that a system of records contains infor-
mation pertaining to him, he has a right of access to that information
under the Act. 7 Having gained access to and reviewed the record, he
82. Privacy Act § 3(e)(5), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(5) (Supp. 1976). "Determina-
tion" is undefined in the Act. A possible interpretation would be any 'decision bearing
directly on the individual as an individual and not as a member of a vague class (when
individual records should be relatively unimportant).
83. Id. Any agency which makes a determination must meet the standards. There
is no exception provided solely because the information came from another agency. See
OMB Guidelines 28,964-65.
84. Privacy Act § 3(e) (6), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e) (6) (Supp. 1976). An example of
such a transfer would be release of tax information by the Internal Revenue Service to a
state agency. As noted earlier, releases under the Freedom of Information Act are
exempt from this requirement. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
85. See text accompanying notes 33-40 supra.
86. The statute also prohibits maintenance of records which describe how an
individual exercises his first amendment rights, unless such maintenance is authorized by
statute or unless the record is "pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law
enforcement activity." Privacy Act § 3(e)(7), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(7) (Supp. 1976).
The breadth of the second exception-law enforcement activity-can be determined only
through experience. In debate in the House, this provision was said to be aimed at
subversive groups and not at intereference with first amendment rights of individual
citizens. 120 CONG. REc. 10,952 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974). The vague terminology,
however, raises serious doubts about the viability of the section as a whole.
87. Privacy Act § 3(d), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d) (Supp. 1976). The individual is
entitled to review the record itself in a form which is comprehensible to him, thus
ensuring that the individual receives something more than an unintelligible computer
print-out. Privacy Act § 3(d)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d)(1) (Supp. 1976). The
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may attempt to amend what he believes to be erroneous information
contained therein. s8 The agency is to take "prompt" actions9 upon a
request for amendment, and if the request is refused, review is availa-
ble.90
It is unclear whether "amendment" simply means change or wheth-
er it also includes deletion, which in some cases could extend to the
expungement of an entire file. "Amendment" seems to carry the impli-
cation that there will be something left when the procedure is finished,
but the right to correct a portion of a record which an individual deems
irrelevant would imply that such information can be deleted. If the
process does not include deletion, the individual would be forced to wait
until some adverse action had been taken on the basis of the irrelevant
information before he could bring an action under the available civil
remedies.91 Clearly the intent of Congress was that files should be
maintained with the highest quality reasonably possible. To deny the
inclusidn of deletion within the amendment process would frustrate that
intent and make injury a prerequisite to remedy when the major thrust
of the Act is preventive.9 2
individual may also obtain a copy of the record. Id. The fee for the copy is not to
include the cost to the agency of searching for and reviewing the record. Privacy Act §
3(f)(5), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(f)(5) (Supp. 1976). Thus the expense of inspecting one's
records is not to be made prohibitive and should ordinarily be nominal.
Agencies will find it necessary to require some kind of identification from persons
who desire access to their records under the Privacy Act. This is not discussed in the
statute itself, but is needed to protect the agency from unauthorized disclosures. OMB
suggests that these procedures be kept at a minimum. OMB Guidelines 28,957. It
should be recalled that these guidelines are not binding so that the amount of identifica-
tion required is left to the discretion of each agency. For a general discussion of rights
of access and challenge under the Act, see Project, supra note 3, at 1315-24.
88. Privacy Act § 3 (d) (2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d) (2) (Supp. 1976).
89. Privacy Act § 3 (d) (2) (B), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d) (2) (B) (Sapp. 1976).
90. The individual has a right to a review within the agency, which is generally to
be completed within thirty days. Privacy Act § 3(d)(3), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d)(3)
(Supp. 1976). If the agency still denies amendment, he may file with the agency a
statement which explains his disagreement with the record and his reasons for such
disagreement. Id. This statement becomes essentially a part of his record. Privacy
Act § 3(d) (4), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d) (4) (Supp. 1976). The individual then has a right
to file an action in federal district court. Privacy Act § 3(g)(1) (A), 5 U.S.C.A. §
552a(g) (1) (A) (Supp. 1976).
91. Suit would be brought under subsection C or D of section 3(g) (1) of the Act.
Privacy Act §§ 3(g)(1)(C)-(D), 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552a(g)(1)(C)-(D) (Supp. 1976).
See text accompanying notes 154-56 infra.
92. There has been some recognition of a right, independent of statute, to expunge-
ment of files. See Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975); Sullivan
v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); United
States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967). The greatest problem seems
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EXEMPTIONS
The exemption provisions are perhaps the most important sections
of the Act, for their application will determine whether the Act really
grants any rights of value to individuals. Many of the records which are
covered by the exemptions will be the very records individuals will most
wish to inspect, and broad denials of access under the exemptions could
make mere platitudes of the principles upon which the Act is construct-
ed.93
General Exemptions
The Act provides for two types of exemption, general94 and speci-
fic.9 5 The general exemptions, as the name suggests, are extremely
broad. If an agency employed every general exemption to which it is
entitled, it would be governed only by the following provisions: consent
for disclosure except in listed instances,9" maintenance of an accounting
(but without being required to disclose it to the individual),97 publica-
tion of an abbreviated notice about its system of records,98 assurance
that records are accurate, complete, timely, and relevant-but only
to be one of standing. It is difficult to show concrete injury from the "mere"
maintenance of a file.
The most celebrated recent case in this area is Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862
(3d Cir. 1975). A high school student working on a school project wrote to the
Socialist Labor Party, inadvertently addressed her letter to the Socialist Workers Party,
and ended up the subject of an FBI file. The FBI determined that she was not involved
in subversive matters, but nevertheless retained the file. She obtained standing largely
on the threat of future injury. Id. The case well illustrates the problems individuals face
outside a statutory framework such as that established by the Privacy Act. For the lower
court's opinion, see 382 F. Supp. 1118 (D.NJ. 1974).
In the absence of a clear expression of intent that Congress wished to leave
individuals to pursue elusive remedies in deleting material from their files before actual
injury befalls them, "amendment" should include "deletion."
93. An important point when considering the exemptions, therefore, is that they are
permissive and not mandatory. The head of an agency must adopt rules under these
sections to take advantage of their provisions and thus is given an opportunity to tailor
the exemptions to fit his agency by adopting only such as are needed. See H.R. REP. No.
1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974). When adopting rules, the agency must state its
reasons for employing an exemption for a system of records. Privacy Act § 3(j)-(k), 5
U.S.C.A. § 552a(j)-(k) (Supp. 1976); see S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 74
(1974). This should promote a thoughtful application of these sections, and avoid any
automatic denial of access to files.
94. Privacy Act § 3(j), 5 U.&C.A. § 552a(j) (Supp. 1976).
95. Privacy Act § 3(k), 5 U.S.C.A. § 55.2a(k) (Supp. 1976).
96. Privacy Act § 3(b), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (Supp. 1976).
97. Privacy Act §§ 3(c)(1)-(Z), 5 U.S.C.A. 0§ 552a(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1976).
98. Privacy Act H9 3(e)(4)(A)-(F), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(4)(A)-(F) (Supp.
1976).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
when releasing the record to a person other than an agency-, 9 9 first
amendment restrictions, 100 establishment of rules of conduct for agency
employees and safeguards for the system,' 0 ' publication of notice of uses
of the system,'0 2 and criminal penalties for violation of the Act. 03 While
the list may appear extensive, it pales in comparison to the provisions
which need not be complied with. The exemption would permit an
agency104 to deny an individual access to his records, 0 5 the right to
know where his records have been and who has seen them, 0 6 the right
to amend his records,107 and even the right to bring a civil action for
damages for violation of the statute. 08 Furthermore, the agency need
not satisfy the requirement that it maintain only relevant and necessary
information within the system generally'0 9 and need not make any effort
to see that the records are accurate, relevant, timely, and complete when
the agency makes a determination about the individual."10 The individ-
ual may bring a civil action to challenge the validity of the exemption
itself,"' but once the exemption is found to have been properly taken by
the agency, there is no further remedy for harm caused to the individual.
The general exemptions reflect the complexity and difficulty of
problems which stem from concerns for national security"12 and crimi-
nal justice. There are valid reasons for the denial of access and a right
to amend that must be recognized in these areas. But to allow agencies
to make decisions which affect individuals on the basis of inaccurate,
irrelevant, or incomplete information raises once again the fundamental
questions which this Act was designed to answer. If collection and
maintenance of material bear on the right to privacy, and if agency use
of information is governed by some standard of due process, then the
99. Privacy Act § 3(e) (6), 5 U.S.C.A. 552a(e) (6) (Supp. 1976).
100. Privacy Act § 3(e)(7), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e) (7) (Supp. 1976).
101. Privacy Act H9 3(e)(9)-(10), 5 U.S.C.A. H9 552a(e)(9)-(10)(Supp. 1976).
102. Privacy Act § 3(e)(11), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(11) (Supp. 1976).
103. Privacy Act § 3(i), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(i) (Supp. 1976).
104. The general exemption section of the statute provides that "[t]he head of [a
qualifying] agency may promulgate rules . . . to exempt any system of records within
the agency from any part of this section except subsections (b), (c) (1) and (2),
(e)(4)(A) through (F), (e)(6), (7), (9), (10), and (11), and (i) ... ." Privacy
Act § 3(j), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(j) (Supp. 1976).
105. Privacy Act § 3(d)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d)(1) (Supp. 1976).
106. Privacy Act § 3(c) (3), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(c) (3) (Siipp. 1976).
107. Privacy Act § 3(d) (2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d) (2) (Supp. 1976).
108. Privacy Act § 3(g), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g) (Supp. 1976).
109. Privacy Act § 3(e)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(1) (Supp. 1976).
110. Privacy Act § 3(e)(6), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(6) (Supp. 1976).
111. Privacy Act § 3(g)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(1) (Supp. 1976).
112. For a discussion of national security and the Freedom of Information Act, see
Warnke, National Security and the Public's Right to Know, 34 FED. BJ. 301 (1975).
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judiciary must still deal with the existence of a constitutional floor
beneath which agencies cannot fall."13 Courts have thus far failed to
develop any law in this area, but the enactment of the Privacy Act
should not prevent such development." 4
In deference to its key national security role, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency is given a blanket option to employ the general exemption
provisions." 5  However, to grant exemptions for a system of records
solely because it is maintained by the CIA places a premium on location
of the system and ignores the more important question of the type of
record involved and the reasons why it should be withheld from the
individual concerned. If the CIA has a need for a broader exemption
than the specific exemption for classified documents provided by the
Act,"' some mechanism in addition to the "national security and for-
eign policy exemption" should have been provided under which the CIA
would be required to justify its action before obtaining an exemption.
The exemption as it stands is unsupportable. The recent debate within
and between Congress and the executive branch over the CIA" 7 will
perhaps create an attitude of less unreasoning deference on the part of
Congress.
113. See note 27 supra. No Supreme Court decision has yet directly confronted the
issue of privacy and due process in the context of data collection and maintenance. Mr.
Justice Douglas, dissenting from a denial of certiorari, did discuss the question to some
extent in Tarver v. Smith, 402 U.S. 1000 (1971). He found that the case raised
questions of due process, as well as more general questions concerning the "privacy and
dignity of individuals." Id. In Tarver, a caseworker had prepared a report recommend-
ing that Mrs. Tarver be deprived of the custody of her children. A hearing was held in
which she was exonerated of the charges in the report, but the document itself remained
in the files of the Department of Social and Health Services of the State of Washington.
Mrs. Tarver sought in this suit to correct the report so that future decisions by the
department concerning her could not be based on erroneous information which she had
already once proven false. Her inability to obtain a hearing to correct the information
raised the due process point for Justice Douglas.
114. The "constitutional floor" concept in this context relates closely to the use of
equitable powers to order expungement of files. See note 92 supra.
115. Privacy Act § 3(j)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(i)(1) (Supp. 1976). The Agency
has not employed all of its power under this subsection. Most notably, no system of
records is exempt from the requirement of maintaining only relevant and necessary
information throughout the system or from the requirements concerning the quality of
individual records. Rules and Regulations to Implement the Privacy Act of 1974, §§
1901.61, 1901.71, 40 Fed. Reg. 45,324 (Oct. 1, 1975).
116. Privacy Act § 3(k)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(1) (Supp. 1976). See notes 124-
26 infra and accompanying text.
117. See INThmm REPORT Op THE SnrATE SELECT COmm. TO STUDY GovEEmENTAL
OPERAIoNs wITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AcTVrrIs, ALL-GED ASSASSINATION PLoTs
INVOLvING FoREmGN LEAcERs, S. REP. No. 465, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 1976, at 1, col. 8; id., Jan. 31, 1976, at 1, col. 1; id., Jan. 30, 1976, at 1,
col. 8; id., Jan. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 6, 7; id., Jan. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 6; id., Jan. 20, 1976,
at 1, col. 5; id., Jan. 15, 1976, at 1, col. 8.
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Criminal law enforcement systems may also employ the general
exemptions.11 8 This provision is subject to the same objection of over-
breadth as the CIA exemption. The criminal exemption will not allow
the opening of records after prosecution 1 9 and will not provide access to
an individual's arrest record so that he may make corrections or addi-
tions. 120  At the time this provision was adopted, Congress was consid-
ering special criminal justice legislation which could have alleviated
these problems. 21  However, the legislation has not yet been enacted,
and absent this assistance, the current Privacy Act exemption for crimi-
nal law enforcement systems should be redrafted more narrowly.1 22
Specific Exemptions
The specific exemptions are more limited and allow exemption
only from certain provisions. An agency entitled to employ these
exemptions for a system of records under its control may be exempt
from the statutory mandates of disclosure of the accounting it must
keep, access and amendment, maintenance of only relevant and neces-
sary information, notice of procedures by which the individual may
learn of the existence of a record and gain access to it, the statement
of categories of sources of records in the system, and promulgation of
rules for access and amendment procedures.12 3
There are seven types of systems which may employ these exemp-
tions. The first is one which contains records covered by the "foreign
policy and national defense" provision of the FOIA.124  This allows
118. Privacy Act § 3(j)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(j)(2) (Supp. 1976).
119. Privacy Act §§ 3(j)(2)(B)-(C), 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552a(j)(2)(B)-(C) (Supp.
1976).
120. Privacy Act § 3(j) (2) (A), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(j) (2) (A) (Supp. 1976).
121. H.R. 12,574, 12,575, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. 2963, 2964, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974).
122. Privacy Act § 3(k) (2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k) (2) (Supp. 1976), provides
a second law enforcement exemption, in the same manner as the "national se-
curity and foreign policy" exemption provides a backstop for the CIA general exemp-
tion. See note 116 supra and accompanying text. The application of the special
exemption will be largely civil, since the general criminal exemption virtually preempts
the field.
123. Privacy Act § 3(k), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k) (Supp. 1976).
124. "This section [Freedom of Information Act] does not apply to matters that are
... specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and . . . are in fact properly
classified pursuant to such Executive order ... ." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1) (Supp.
1976). This section of the FOIA was amended in 1974 to overcome the impact of
EPA v. Mink, 401 U.S. 73 (1973), which required federal courts to accept the fact
of executive classification of a document and prohibited an in camera inspection to
see if it was in fact properly classified.
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exemption of classified material and again ties the two acts together.
The FOIA exemption provides for a court determination, if necessary,
that executive documents are properly classified; 2 5 the Privacy Act
incorporates the same procedure. 2 6
The second system which may be exempted is one which contains
"investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes,"' 2 7 and
is designed for material not covered by the earlier general exemption for
criminal records. 28 The term adopted here apparently refers back to
the law enforcement exemption of the FOIA as it stood before amend-
ment in 1974.129 The exemption applies only up to the point at which
the maintenance of the material results in the "denial of any right,
privilege, or benefit" to which the individual would "otherwise be
entitled by federal law, or for which he would otherwise be eligible."'' 10
This may be construed broadly enough to imply that any time a federal
agency makes an adverse determination concerning an individual which
is based even in part upon law enforcement material, the individual
would be entitled to gain access to the information. The agency,
however, must continue to protect the sources of its information.'
A further exemption is provided for the Secret Service. 3 2  This
provision, like the CIA general exemption, provides an exemption for
records based upon their location rather than their substance.3 3  This
125. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 1976). See 120 CoNo. RPc. 10,964 (daily
ed. Nov. 21, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Drinan).
126. The in camera inspection should be the last action to which the court will resort
in making its decision. If possible, the court should make its determination of the
propriety of a classification by reference to agency testimony and affidavits. See
Attorney General's Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act 1-4 (Feb. 1975).
127. Privacy Act § 3(k)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k) (2) (Supp. 1976).
128. Id. See note 122 supra.
129. The 1974 changes made the provision considerably more detailed. Prior to
amendment the exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (1970), withheld from the public
"investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available
by law to a party other than an agency." Construction of this clause had resulted in a
test which in general asked only if the files were properly designated as investigatory
files. Exemption would be permitted if the files were compiled in relation to any
occurrence which could be described as an enforcement proceeding. See Weisberg v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
993 (1974); Bristol-Myers Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970).
130. Privacy Act § 3(k) (2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k) (2) (Sapp. 1976).
131. Id.
132. Privacy Act § 3(k)(3), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(3) (Supp. 1976).
133. The exemption applies if the system is "maintained in connection with providing
protective services to the President of the United States or other individuals pursuant to
section 3056 of title 18 . . ." Id.
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emphasis on location, as discussed above in the CIA context,13 4 is
misguided in that it ignores the type of record involved. The exemption
is thus open to abuse, although to a lesser degree than is possible under
the CIA exemption, since the Secret Service can only exempt itself from
certain specifically enumerated'35 provisions. A narrower exemption
which focused upon records of individuals as they bear directly upon the
Secret Servicees protective function should have been sufficient.3 6
Statistical records are exempted,13 as is federal "testing or ex-
amination material used solely to determine individual qualifications for
appointment and promotion ... ."'l The testing exemption is de-
signed to protect the integrity of the examination process, for if such
material were released, the value of that examination for future use
would be hopelessly compromised." 9
Investigatory material used to determine "suitability, eligibility, or
qualifications" for federal employment, contracts, or access to classified
material 4 ° and "evaluation material used solely to determine potential
for promotion" in the military14' are the last two exempted systems.
The specific exemptions are, of course, more narrowly drawn than
the general provisions. Exemption from the requirement that the agen-
cy maintain only relevant and necessary material is to a large extent
overcome by the retained requirement that the agency must make an
effort to see that the information is accurate, relevant, timely, and
complete before a determination which affects an individual is made.
The agency, however, may maintain irrelevant and unnecessary informa-
tion so long as it does not use it in making a determination about an
individual.1 42 The agency is nevertheless more accountable for its
134. See text following note 115 supra.
135. See Privacy Act § 3(k), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k) (Supp. 1976).
136. The present exemption provides only that records be "maintained in connection
with providing protective services," Privacy Act § 3(k)(3), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(3)
(Supp. 1976), a phrase broad enough to cover even those records which would not
affect the security of the guarded individuals, such as travel and budget records. See
note 133 supra.
137. Privacy Act § 3(k)(4), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(4) (Supp. 1976).
138. Privacy Act § 3(k) (6), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k) (6) (Supp. 1976).
139. The apparent congressional feeling was that release of such information is of
little assistance to the individual, particularly as balanced against the harm caused to the
testing agency. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1974) (additional views of
committee members); 120 C1oe. REc. 10,997 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1974) (remarks of
Rep. Erlenborn).
140. Privacy Act § 3(k)(5), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(5) (Supp. 1976).
141. Privacy Act § 3(k)(7), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(7) (Supp. 1976). These are
applicable "only to the extent that the disclosure would reveal the identity of the source"
who provided the information under conditions of confidentiality.
142. If the agency could not use the information, presumably it would not have any
(Vol. 1976:301
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administration of the rest of the provisions of the Act than it might be
under the general exemptions because the specific exemptions do not
allow for the deprivation of civil remedies under the Act.143
A "hidden" exemption is contained in the section of the Act which
grants access to records. "[A]ny information compiled in reasonable
anticipation of a civil action or proceeding" may be withheld from the
individual to whom it may pertain.14 This does not appear to be
limited to protection of sources as is the specific law enforcement
exemption,1 45 and thus could be used by the agency to withhold the
entire file and not just the source. The OMB Guidelines suggest that
the purpose for which the information was gathered, and not the fact
that it is the subject of litigation, should be the determining factor in this
section.14
CiviL REMEDIES
There are two types of civil actions under the Act. 147  One allows
an individual to sue the agency in federal district court upon a denial of
individual access or refusal or failure to properly honor a request for
amendment.' 48  The individual is not required to allege or prove any
reason to maintain it. But there is no guarantee that this would be the case. The Census
Bureau, which occasionally handles questionnaires for other agencies, has been particu-
larly subject to the criticism that certain of its requests for information are unwarranted
and result in the collection of much unneeded information. See Privacy, The Census
and Federal Questionnaires, Hearings on S. 1791 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-8 (1970) (statement of
Sen. Ervin).
143. The list of provisions from which the agency may exempt itself under the Act,
Privacy Act § 3(k), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k) (Supp. 1976), does not include the civil
remedies provision. Privacy Act § 3(g), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g) (Supp. 1976).
144. Privacy Act § 3(d)(5), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d)(5) (Supp. 1976).
145. Privacy Act § 3(k)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(2) (Supp. 1976).
146. OMB Guidelines 28,960. Agencies are not required to resort to formal rulemak-
ing for the use of this section. OM9 also suggests that the agency use this exemption
only when nothing else is applicable. Id. This does not alter its availability or restrict
agency use in any way.
147. The individual may bring suit under this section in the district court in the
district where he resides or has his principal place of business, in the district where the
records are located, or in the District of Columbia. Privacy Act § 3(g) (5), 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 552a(g) (5) (Supp. 1976). If an individual is injured, the statute of limitations is two
years. Id. No action may be maintained under the Act for injury which results from
disclosure prior to September 27, 1975, the effective date of these sections of the Privacy
Act. Id.
148. Privacy Act. §§ 3(g)(1)(A)-(B), 5 U.S.CA. §§ 552a(g)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp.
1976).
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injury resulting from the government's maintenance of the informa-
tion.140
Suit brought for access is the major means of challenging exemp-
tions which agencies attempt to employ. It is here that the court may
examine documents in camera to determine if they may properly be
withheld from the individual.150 The controversy will be determined de
novo and the agency bears the burden of justifying its action in employ-
ing an exemption.15 ' Because the agency is the party with access to the
material, the individual would have an almost insurmountable problem
in showing, for example, that information is improperly classified when
he does not know exactly what the information is.
However, if an individual wishes to amend his record and brings
suit, the burden will be on him to show that his record should be
amended.1 52 Here the situation is the converse of the access suit since
the individual is generally in a better position than the agency to
produce information showing that the material contained in his record is
erroneous.
153
The other civil action which may be brought under the Privacy Act
is predicated upon injury to the individual. The individual has an
action if an agency makes a determination adverse to him on the basis of
a record which has not been maintained with proper accuracy, rele-
vance, timeliness, and completeness.' 54 An action also lies whenever an
agency "fails to comply with any other provision of this section, or any
rule promulgated thereunder, in such a way as to have an adverse effect
149. This overcomes any problems of standing which otherwise exist. See note 92
supra.
150. Determination of the propriety of withholding documents is provided to escape
the restrictions imposed in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). See note 124 supra.
151. Privacy Act § 3(g)(3)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(A) (Supp. 1976). This
scheme substantially departs from ordinary judicial review of administrative action, in
which an agency determination will be overturned only if the record shows that it was
arbitrary or capricious or in violation of constitutional or statutory substantive or
procedural provisions. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
152. This is implied. The party bringing suit normally carries the burden of
demonstrating the impropriety of administrative action. See, e.g., Udall v. Washington,
Va. & Md. Coach Co., 398 F.2d 765, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017
(1969). Congress indicated no contrary intent in the Privacy Act.
153. In either of these nondamage suits, the individual may recover -reasonable
attorney's fees and other costs if, in the court's opinion, the individual has "substantially
prevailed." Privacy Act § 3(g) (2) (B), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g) (2) (B) (Supp. 1976). In
these actions, the agency's conduct in refusing access or amendment is irrelevant in
determining whether or not access or amendment is warranted. However, it may bear
upon the issue of an award of attorney's fees.
154. Privacy Act § 3(g)(1)(C), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g) (1) (C) (Supp. 1976).
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on an individual."155 Breach of this "catch-all" provision must be
causally related to an adverse determination which has in fact been
made, and the individual must show that the agency "acted in a manner
which was intentional or willful."'156
This "intentional or willful" standard, the result of a compromise
between the House and Senate bills, has been explained as "only some-
what greater than gross negligence." 157  The House provided for no
recovery unless agency action was arbitrary;' 58 the Senate wished to use
a standard of simple negligence.1r 9 While the compromise standard
enlarges the difficulty faced by those attempting to recover damages
under this section, it is preferable to the House proposal which, if
adopted, would have sanctioned broad exercise of discretion by agencies
and made the civil remedies virtually useless.
The individual need not prove the actual amount of damages. It
will of course be in his best interest to do so if the damage is substantial,
but the Act provides that, in all cases where the individual is entitled to
recover, he is to receive at least $1,000, 0 in addition to reasonable
attorney's fees and costs.'8 '
The largest deterrent to actions under the damage section is the
requisite proof of "intentional or willful" behavior by the agency. If the
individual's injury is either small or difficult to prove, it may not be
worthwhile to seek redress for a clear injury and violation of the Act if it
is not clear that something more than gross negligence can be shown.
The stakes will simply not be high enough. This deterrent to litigation
might be less crucial if other means of enforcement of the Act were
readily available. Unfortunately, present enforcement clearly depends
on agency cooperation, continuing congressional oversight, and the civil
actions outlined above.' 62
155. Privacy Act § 3 (g) (1) (D), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g) (1) (D) (Supp. 1976).
156. Privacy Act § 3(g)(4), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(4) (Supp. 1976). (emphasis
added).
157. Privacy Act Compromise Analysis 12,245, 21,817.
158. H.R. 16,373 § 2(g)(3), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), 120 CoNG. REc. 10,893,
10,895 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1974); id. at 10,971 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974) (passed by
House).
159. S. 3418 § 303(c), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), 120 CONG. RE 19,858, 19,862
(daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974); id. at 19,858 (passed by Senate).
160. Privacy Act § 3(g) (4) (A), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g) (4) (A) (Supp. 1976).
161. Privacy Act § 3(g)(4)(B), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g) (4) (B) (Supp. 1976). The
court does not seem to have any discretion; fees are to be awarded. This should be
distinguished from the earlier attorney's fees provision which used the language "may."
See note 153 supra.
162. "Realistically, therefore, the implementation of the Act rests, finally, with the
departments and agencies of the executive branch and the good faith, ethical conduct and
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PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION
The Privacy Protection Study Commission has been established to
conduct a broad study of the problems encountered by individuals in the
areas of privacy and the gathering and use of information throughout
the public and private sector.16 3 The Commission is to make reports .at
least annually to the President and to the Congress concerning its
activities and to make recommendations for future action.164 It is
authorized to give assistance to state and local agencies, if requested, 115
and to give advice and assistance to federal agencies in carrying out the
present law, if requested.'68 The Commission has no power to take the
initiative in these areas or to compel an agency to take any action in
carrying out the mandates of the Privacy Act. It has no rulemaking
authority, other than that needed to govern itself,1 7 and cannot go into
court seeking enforcement of the statute.
Congressional reluctance to create a body with power and authority
to enforce the Privacy Act stems largely from a disinclination to add yet
another agency to the federal bureaucracy.6 8 As a result, enforcement
is at the moment largely a function of agency goodwill and good faith,
congressional oversight, and individual action in pursuit of the rights
granted to citizens by the Act. A decision has thus been postponed as
to whether some central, independent body with authority over other
federal agencies is essential to any coherent and effective protection of
integrity of the Federal employees who serve in them." S. RaP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 28 (1974). This statement was made in light of the Senate bill which provided for
a Privacy Protection Commission with some power, an enforcement mechanism lacking
in the final bill. Cf. Cohen, Agencies Prepare Regulations for Implementing New
Privacy Law, 7 NAT'L J. REP. 774 (1975). For suggested alternatives, see text
accompanying notes 174-75 infra.
163. Privacy Act § 5(a)-(e). The Commission is the result of a compromise. The
Senate bill provided for a commission with some power. S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
title I (1974); 120 CONG. REc. 19,858 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974) (passed by Senate).
The House provided for no commission or board of any sort. See Metz, Privacy
Legislation: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 34 FaD. BAn. J. 311, 314 (1975).
The Commission's executive director has indicated that the group will concentrate
first on commercial privacy issues, followed by studies of intergovernmental questions
with a privacy impact, such as public assistance and social services, housing, school
record and employment data. Cohen, Privacy: Alive, But Barely, 8 NAV'L J. REP. 185
(1976).
164. Privacy Act § 5(g).
165. Id. § 5(d)(4).
166. Id. § 5(d)(2).
167. Id. § 5(e)(4)(A).
168. See S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-26 (1974); H.R. RaP. No. 1416,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1974) (additional views of committee members); 120 CONG.
Rac. 10,959 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Moorhead).
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the rights of privacy and due process. The experience gained in admin-
istration of the Act during the life of the Study Commission should be
crucial to this determination.
To rely upon agencies to police the Act is, at best, to invite
problems. Agency interest in efficiency, budgetary restrictions, and
need for information could all too often conflict with the individual's
desires and rights under this statute. Agencies cannot reasonably be
expected to promote zealously that which is felt to be in conflict with
their own interests. 6 9
As discussed above, the individual right of action contains a built-
in deterrent. 170 In addition to facing the cost of a lawsuit, the potential
plaintiff must also consider the desirability of threading through a maze
of regulations and systems notices. There is no coordination among
these rules and no authority anywhere to direct coordination. The
OMB Guidelines have no binding force.171 Therefore, decisions imple-
menting the Act will essentially be judgmental for each agency involved;
ambiguous and vague phrasing in the Act clearly lends itself to more
than one interpretation and to the exercise of agency discretion. Fur-
ther, rules promulgated by the agencies will become prima facie valid,
subject to a finding of arbitrarinessY.12 It will thus be possible for valid
and varying interpretations of the same section to be applied to the
individual, depending upon which agency he turns to in his quest for
information. Each agency will admittedly have unique problems with
which it must deal under the Act, but it seems unrealistic and unfair to
expect the individual to shoulder the entire burden of finding a way
through the bureaucratic puzzle which may confront him. While con-
gressional oversight can produce remedial legislation to correct problems
and can correct individual instances of abuse, it does not seem to offer
an overall solution to the practical everyday administrative problems
presented by the Act.
Perhaps the enforcement method which Congress has chosen for
the moment will bring better results than expected, but experience under
169. See Cohen, supra note 163.
170. See text accompanying note 162 supra.
171. In future litigation, the OMB Guidelines may provide a standard against which
to measure the agency's action in interpreting the Act. If the agency interpretation
strays too far from the OMB suggestions, that in itself may indicate that the agency has
enforced the Act erroneously in an "intentional or willful" manner, thus opening the
door for an individual recovery when harm has resulted from the agency interpretation.
172. Regulations under the Privacy Act are promulgated under 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1970). Privacy Act § 3(f), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(f) (Supp. 1976). They are thus
subject to review as are other federal regulations. See OMB Guidelines 28,967.
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the FOIA in its early years does not bring much hope. 173 However, the
reluctance to adopt a new level of bureaucracy is understandable, and
the congressional attitude of "wait-and-see" may well be the lesser of
two evils.
Congress may ultimately be forced to take some action to provide
enforcement mechanisms if administration of the Act becomes chaotic.
An independent commission, with power to enforce the Privacy Act
and perhaps the FOIA, would probably be the most effective route.
Other possibilities would be to lodge enforcement power with the Attor-
ney General and the Justice Department, thus sharing the individual's
burden.1 74  Consideration should also be given to relaxing the civil
standard of proof to simple negligence, thus promoting individual en-
forcement. A further change could be the addition of a punitive
damage section, an alternative considered and rejected in 1974.115
Whatever the future, the present scheme does not appear to offer the
effective enforcement necessary to live up to the promises of the Privacy
Act.17 0
CONCLUSION
The Privacy Act of 1974- is a milestone. It marks a recognition of
the dangers inherent in the unbridled collection and maintenance of
information and the fundamental unfairness of denying an individual
access to material relating to him. This recognition alone provides the
basis for restoring a balance between rights to privacy and due process
and governmental need for information.
Since the scope of the exemption provisions will determine the ulti-
mate value of the Act for many, they should be re-examined and drawn
more tightly. The rationale behind each exemption should be articu-
lated and examined with a critical and sometimes skeptical eye. En-
forcement mechanisms need to be upgraded and perhaps even added.
Discretionary power for agencies is manifest throughout the provisions
of the Act. If the terms themselves cannot be stated more precisely,
then perhaps principles of construction need to be added so that courts
173. See generally Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5
HARV. CIrV. RGHTS-Crv. Lm. L REV. 1 (1970); Note, The Freedom of Information Act:
A Critical Review, 38 GEo. WA h. L REv. 150 (1969).
174. See text accompanying notes 170-72 supra.
175. 120 CoNe. Rc. 10,900-02 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1974).
176. Some concern about the Ford Administration's commitment to furthering priva-
cy protections has been created by elimination from the fiscal 1976 budget of all funding
for the Domestic Council Committee on the Right to Privacy. Cohen, supra note 163.
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will not readily defer to agency determinations as much as they have in
the past.
Whatever its drawbacks, the Act is a beginning. Experience may
show present fears to be minor irritations, while unforeseen complica-
tions may arise. If the Congress fulfills its function as watchdog, the
foundation for further protection of the individual found here may be a
turning point in the continuing relationship of government to the gov-
erned.
